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Abstract. Arbitrary public announcement logic (APAL) is a logic of
change of knowledge with modalities representing quantification over an-
nouncements. We present two rather different versions of APAL wherein
this quantification is restricted to formulas only containing a subset of
all propositional variables: FSAPAL and SCAPAL; and another version
quantifying over all announcements implied by or implying a given for-
mula: IPAL. We then determine the relative expressivity of these logics
and APAL. The IPAL quantifier provides a novel perspective on sub-
structural implication as dynamic consequence.
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1 Introduction
The modal logic of knowledge was originally proposed to give a relational se-
mantics for the perceived properties of knowledge, such as that what you know
is true, and that you know what you know, and to contrast this with the proper-
ties of other epistemic notions such as belief [24]. Already in [24] the analysis of
paradoxical phenomena that you cannot be informed of factual ignorance while
‘losing’ that ignorance, so-called Moorean phenomena [26], played an important
role. On the heels of the logic of (single agent) knowledge came the multi-agent
logics of knowledge, wherein similar phenomena are not so paradoxical: there is
no issue with my knowledge of your ignorance. This led on the one hand to the
development of group epistemic notions such as common knowledge [5,25] and
distributed knowledge [23], topics that we will bypass in this contribution. On
the other hand this led to increased interest in the analysis of multiple agents
informing each other of their ignorance and knowledge, often inspired by logic
puzzles [27,25]. This culminated in Plaza’s public announcement logic (PAL)
[28], wherein such informative actions became full members of the logical lan-
guage besides the knowledge modalities; parallel developments of dynamic but
not epistemic logics of information change are [19,10].
PAL contains a dynamic operator representing the consequences of infor-
mation change that is similarly observed by all agents, so-called public (and
truthful) announcement. We let [ψ]ϕ stand for ‘after truthful public announce-
ment of ψ, ϕ (is true). Every PAL formula is equivalent to a formula without
public announcements, so that PAL is as expressive as epistemic logic EL (a.k.a.
the logic S5) [28].
From PAL there were various directions for further generalization. One could
consider public announcements in the presence of group epistemic operators such
as common knowledge, or non-public information change such as private or secret
announcements to some agents while other agents do not or only partially observe
that. Both were simultaneously realized in action model logic [8]; parallel, now
lesser known, developments are [22].
A different direction of generalizing PAL is to consider quantifying over an-
nouncements. Arbitrary public announcement logic APAL was proposed in [6]
and contains a construct [!]ϕ standing for ‘after any truthful public announce-
ment, ϕ (is true)’, i.e., for all ψ, [ψ]ϕ. In order to avoid circularity, the APAL
quantifier is only over announcements not containing [!] modalities. There is an
infinitary (not RE) axiomatization for the logic [7], where an open question re-
mains whether there is a finitary (RE) axiomatization. APAL is undecidable [20],
and the complexity of model checking is PSPACE-complete [1]. There are ver-
sions of APAL with finitary axiomatizations or decidable satisfiability problems
[14,15,9], or that model aspects of agency [1,2,21]. APAL is more expressive than
PAL [6]. The relative expressivity of versions of APAL is rather intricate, and
most relevant in view of potential applications. For example, group announce-
ment logic GAL and APAL are incomparable in expressivity [21], and in GAL
we can formalize goal reachability in finite two-principal security protocols [1].
In this contribution we investigate some novel versions of APAL. If we quan-
tify over announcements only using atoms in subsets Q ⊆ P we obtain the logic
SAPAL, and if these subsets are required to be finite we get FSAPAL. If we
quantify over announcements only using atoms occurring in the formula under
the scope of the quantifier, we obtain the logic SCAPAL. If we quantify over
announcements implying a given formula ψ or implied by a given formula ψ and
if such ψ may also contain quantifiers we obtain logic QIPAL and if they are not
allowed to contain quantifiers we obtain IPAL.
In Section 2 we introduce their syntax and semantics, in Section 3 we prove
some modal properties of these quantifiers. Section 4 determines the expressivity
hierarchy for the reported logics. This section contains our main results. They
are depicted in Fig. 1. Let ≺ mean ‘(strictly) less expressive’ and  ‘incompara-
ble’, then the results are that PAL is less expressive than any of the logics with
quantifiers, and that SCAPAL ≺ FSAPAL, APAL  SCAPAL, APAL  FS-
APAL, IPAL  SCAPAL, IPAL  FSAPAL, and APAL ≺ IPAL (proof omitted
for lack of space and therefore called a conjecture). The complete axiomatiza-
tions and the undecidability of satisfiability of our APAL versions all promise to
be the same as for APAL. We conclude with Section 5 reinterpreting dynamic




Fig. 1. Expressivity hierarchy of logics presented in this work. An arrow means larger
expressivity. Assume transitivity. Absence of an arrow means incomparability.
2 Syntax and semantics: SAPAL, SCAPAL, QIPAL
Throughout this contribution, let a countable set P be of propositional atoms
and a finite set A of agents be given.
Definition 1 (Language). The logical language L is defined inductively as:
ϕ ::= > | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Kaϕ | [ϕ]ϕ | [!]ϕ | [Q]ϕ | [⊆]ϕ | [ϕ↓]ϕ | [ϕ↑]ϕ
p ∈ P , a ∈ A, and Q ⊆ P . The propositional sublanguage is LPL, with addi-
tionally modalities Ka we get the epistemic formulas LEL, with additionally the
construct [ϕ]ϕ it is LPAL, and adding one of the quantifiers [!], [Q], [⊆], [ϕ↓]ψ
and [ϕ↑]ψ we obtain, respectively, LAPAL, LSAPAL and LSCAPAL, LQIPAL↓ and
LQIPAL↑ . Adding both [ϕ↓]ψ and [ϕ↑]ψ we obtain LQIPAL, and if the ϕ in [ϕ↓]ψ
and [ϕ↑]ψ is restricted to LPAL, we get LIPAL. If the Q in [Q]ϕ are (always)
finite we get LFSAPAL.
The meaning of all constructs will be explained after defining the semantics. The
dual modalities for [!], [Q], [⊆], [ϕ↓], and [ϕ↑] are, respectively, 〈!〉, 〈Q〉, 〈⊆〉, 〈ϕ↓〉,
and 〈ϕ↑〉. Instead of ϕ ∈ LX we also say that ϕ is an X formula. For any language
L, L|Q is the sublanguage only containing atoms in Q ⊆ P . Given ϕ ∈ L,
P (ϕ) ⊆ denotes the set of atoms occurring in ϕ. For [{p1, . . . , pn}]ϕ we may write
[p1 . . . pn]ϕ. The modal depth d(ϕ) of a formula is the maximum stack of epistemic
modalities; it is defined as: d(⊥) = d(p) = 0, d(ϕ ∧ ψ) = max{d(ϕ, d(ψ)},
d(Kaϕ) = d(ϕ) + 1, d([ϕ]ψ) = d([ϕ
↓]ψ) = d([ϕ↑]ψ) = d(ϕ) + d(ψ), and d([!]ϕ) =
d([⊆]ϕ) = d([Q]ϕ) = d(¬ϕ) = d(ϕ).
Definition 2 (Structures). An epistemic model (or model) is a triple M =
(S,∼, V ) where S is a domain of states, ∼ is a set of binary relations ∼a ⊆ S × S
that are all equivalence relations, and V : P → P(S) maps each atom p ∈ P to
its denotation V (p).
Given a model M , we may refer to its domain, relations, and valuation as SM ,
∼Ma , and VM respectively, and we also refer to the domain of M as D(M).
Bisimulation to compare models will be defined later. A model N is a submodel
of M , notation N ⊆ M , if SN ⊆ SM , for all a ∈ A, ∼Na = ∼Ma ∩ (SN × SN ),
and for all p ∈ P , V N (p) = VM (p) ∩ SN .
Definition 3 (Semantics). Given model M = (S,∼, V ), s ∈ S and ϕ ∈ L we
inductively define M, s |= ϕ (ϕ is true in state s of model M) as:
M, s |= p iff s ∈ V (p)
M, s |= ¬ϕ iff M, s |= ϕ
M, s |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, s |= ϕ and M, s |= ψ
M, s |= Kaϕ iff for all t ∈ S, s ∼a t implies M, t |= ϕ
M, s |= [ψ]ϕ iff M, s |= ψ implies M |ψ, s |= ϕ
M, s |= [!]ϕ iff for any ψ ∈ LPAL : M, s |= [ψ]ϕ
M, s |= [Q]ϕ iff for any ψ ∈ LPAL|Q : M, s |= [ψ]ϕ
M, s |= [⊆]ϕ iff for any ψ ∈ LPAL|P (ϕ) : M, s |= [ψ]ϕ
M, s |= [χ↓]ϕ iff for any ψ ∈ LPAL implying χ : M, s |= [ψ]ϕ
M, s |= [χ↑]ϕ iff for any ψ ∈ LPAL implied by χ : M, s |= [ψ]ϕ
where M |ϕ = (S′,∼′, V ′) is such that S′ = JϕKM = {s ∈ S | M, s |= ϕ},
∼′a = ∼a ∩ (JϕKM × JϕKM ), and V ′(p) = V (p) ∩ JϕKM .
A formula ϕ is valid on model M , notation M |= ϕ, iff for all s ∈ S,
M, s |= ϕ, and ϕ is valid, notation |= ϕ, iff ϕ is valid on all models M . A formula
ϕ is a distinguishing formula of a subset S′ ⊆ S of M (or S′ is definable by ϕ)
if for all t ∈ S, M, t |= ϕ and for all t /∈ S, M, t 6|= ϕ.
In the dual existential reading of the semantics of the quantifiers, the ψ in ‘there
is a ψ ∈ LPAL’ is the witness of the quantifier. In the semantics of the last two,
‘ψ implies χ’ means |= ψ → χ and ‘ψ is implied by χ’ means |= χ→ ψ.
PAL and APAL Public announcement logic PAL and arbitrary public an-
nouncement logic APAL were already introduced.
SAPAL and FSAPAL The logic with construct [Q]ϕ, for ‘after any announce-
ment only containing atoms in Q ⊆ P ’, is called SAPAL, for APAL with quan-
tification over formulas restricted to subsets of variables. If those subsets are
required to be finite we get FSAPAL.
SCAPAL The logic with construct [⊆]ϕ, for ‘after any announcement only
containing atoms ocurring in ϕ’, is called SCAPAL (where ϕ is the formula
under the scope of the quantifier [⊆]).
QIPAL The logic with constructs [ψ↓]ϕ and [ψ↑]ϕ is called QIPAL; where [ψ↓]ϕ
stands for ‘after every announcement implying ψ, ϕ is true’, and [ψ↑]ϕ stands for
‘after every announcement implied by ψ, ϕ is true’. In QIPAL we can reason over
restrictions of a given model M that are submodels of M |ψ, or over restrictions
that contain M |ψ as a submodel.
Bisimulation We define several notions of bisimulation between models and ob-
tain some elementary invariance results for our logics. They will be used much
in the expressivity Section 4.
Definition 4 (Bisimulation). Let M and N be epistemic models. A non-
empty relation Z ⊆ SM × SN is a bisimulation between M and N if for all
Zst, p ∈ P and a ∈ A:
— atoms: s ∈ VM (p) iff t ∈ V N (p).
— forth: if s ∼Ma s′, then there is a t′ ∈ SN such that t ∼Na t′ and Zs′t′.
— back: if t ∼Na t′, then there is a s′ ∈ SM such that s ∼Ma s′ and Zs′t′.
If there exists a bisimulation Z between M and N we write M ↔ N (or Z :
M ↔ N , to indicate the relation), and if it contains pair (s, t), we write (M, s) ↔
(N, t). If the atoms clause is only satisfied for atoms Q ⊆ P , we write M ↔Q N
and Z is called a Q-bisimulation or a (Q-)restricted bisimulation.
Definition 5 (Bounded bisimulation). Let M and N be epistemic models.
For n ∈ N we define a sequence Z0 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Zn of relations on SM × SN .
A non-empty relation Z0 is a 0-bisimulation if for all Z0st and p ∈ P :
— atoms: s ∈ VM (p) iff t ∈ V N (p).
A non-empty relation Zn+1 is an (n+ 1)-bisimulation if for all Zn+1st, a ∈ A:
— (n+ 1)-forth: if s ∼Ma s′, then there is a t′ ∈ SN s.t. t ∼Na t′ and Zns′t′.
— (n+ 1)-back: if t ∼Na t′, then there is a s′ ∈ SM s.t. s ∼Ma s′ and Zns′t′.
If there exists a n-bisimulation Zn between M and N we write M ↔n N . (We
also combine the notations ↔Q and ↔n in the obvious way, writing ↔Q,n.)
Given pointed models (M, s) and (N, t) and a logic L with language LL,
(M, s) ≡L (N, t) denotes: for all ϕ ∈ LL, M, s |= ϕ iff N, t |= ϕ. Given Q ⊆ P
and n ∈ N, annotations ≡nL and ≡
Q
L restrict the evaluated formulas ϕ ∈ LL to
those of modal depth d(ϕ) ≤ n and (resp.) to ϕ ∈ LL|Q. APAL is invariant for
bisimilarity, but not for restricted bisimilarity or bounded bisimilarity: (M, s)↔
(N, t) implies (M, s) ≡APAL (N, t), whereas (M, s) ↔n (N, t) may not imply
(M, s) ≡nAPAL (N, t), and (M, s)↔Q (N, t) may not imply (M, s) ≡
Q
APAL (N, t)
[6,16]. This is because the APAL modality [!] implicitly quantifies over formulas
of arbitrarily large modal depth and over infinitely many atoms. All logics we
consider in this paper are invariant for bisimilarity.
Lemma 1. For any L considered, (M, s) ↔ (N, t) implies (M, s) ≡L (N, t).
Proof. For example, case quantifier for FAPAL: M, s |= [Q]ψ, iff M, s |= [ϕ]ψ
for all ϕ ∈ LPAL|Q, iff M, s |= ϕ implies M |ϕ, s |= ψ for all ϕ ∈ LPAL|Q, iff (by
induction) N, t |= ϕ implies N |ϕ, t |= ψ for all ϕ ∈ LPAL|Q, (. . . ) iff N, t |= [Q]ψ.
Corollary 1. Let M, s |= ϕ. Then (M, s) ↔ (N, t) implies (M |ϕ, s) ↔ (N |ϕ, t).
For bounded bisimilarity this only holds for L = EL, PAL (a special case of
[13], and given that PAL is as expressive as EL). As we use this result virtu-
ally identically for the inductive case announcement in subsequent proofs in the
expressivity section, we give its full proof.
Lemma 2. Let n ∈ N and ϕ ∈ LPAL with d(ϕ) = k ≤ n, models (M, s) and
(N, t), and M, s |= ϕ be given. If (M, s) ↔n (N, t), then (M |ϕ, s) ↔n−k (N |ϕ, t).
Proof. Let Z0 ⊇ · · · ⊇ Zn be such that Z0 : (M, s) ↔0 (N, t), . . . , Zn :
(M, s)↔n (N, t). For all i = 0, . . . , n− k, let Ziϕ : D(M)→ D(N) be defined as:
Ziϕst iff Z
i+kst and M, s |= ϕ. As d(ϕ) ≤ n, from n-bisimulation invariance for
PAL and M, s |= ϕ also follows that N, t |= ϕ.
By natural induction on n − k we show that Zn : (M, s) ↔n (N, t) implies
Zn−kϕ : (M |ϕ, s)↔n−k (N |ϕ, t), from which the required follows.
Case n − k = 0. We show atoms. We have that Z0ϕst iff Zkst, where the
latter follows from Zk ⊇ Zn and Znst. Therefore, Z0ϕ : (M |ϕ, s)↔0 (N |ϕ, t).
Case n − k > 0. We show (n − k)-forth. Let s ∼a s′ and M, s′ |= ϕ, i.e.,
s ∼a s′ in M |ϕ. From Zn : (M, s) ↔n (N, t) and s ∼a s′ follows that there
is a t′ ∼a t such that Zn−1 : (M, s′) ↔n−1 (N, t′). As n − k = n − d(ϕ) > 0,
d(ϕ) < n, so d(ϕ) ≤ n − 1. From Zn−1 : (M, s′) ↔n−1 (N, t′), M, s′ |= ϕ and
d(ϕ) ≤ n − 1 it follows by bisimulation invariance that N, t′ |= ϕ. Therefore
t′ is in the domain of N |ϕ. By induction, from Zn−1 : (M, s′) ↔n−1 (N, t′)
it follows that Zn−k−1ϕ : (M |ϕ, s′) ↔n−k−1 (N |ϕ, t′). Therefore, t′ satisfies the
requirement for (n− k)-forth for relation Zn−kϕ .
The clause (n− k)-back is shown similarly.
Proposition 1. (M, s) ↔Q (N, t) implies (M, s) ≡QSAPAL (N, t) and implies
(M, s) ≡QSCAPAL (N, t).
Proof. The proof is by induction on formulas true in (M, s). The crucial case
quantifier is satisfied because (let R ⊆ Q): M, s |= [R]ϕ, iff M, s |= [ψ]ϕ for
all ψ ∈ LPAL|R, iff for all ψ ∈ LPAL|R, M, s |= ψ implies M |ψ, s |= ϕ, iff
(induction, Cor. 1) for all ψ ∈ LPAL|R, N, s |= ψ implies N |ψ, s |= ϕ, iff (. . . )
N, s |= [R]ϕ.
The proof for SCAPAL is similar.
3 Modal properties of the quantifiers
We continue by discussing some peculiarities of the semantics, where we focus
on modal properties of the quantifiers. We recall that APAL satisfies: [!]ϕ → ϕ
(T), [!]ϕ→ [!][!]ϕ (4), 〈!〉[!]ϕ→ [!]〈!〉ϕ (CR), and [!]〈!〉ϕ→ 〈!〉[!]ϕ (MK) [6,16].
3.1 SAPAL and FSAPAL
The logic SAPAL generalizes APAL, as [P ]ϕ is equivalent to [!]ϕ. We also con-
sidered FSAPAL where Q ⊆ P in [Q]ϕ is required to be finite.
Proposition 2. SAPAL-valid are [Q]ϕ→ ϕ (T) and [Q ∪R]ϕ→ [Q][R]ϕ (4)
Proof. The validity of [Q]ϕ → ϕ follows from the validity of [>]ϕ ↔ ϕ. Just
as for APAL, [Q ∪ R]ϕ → [Q][R]ϕ is valid because two announcements can be
made into one announcement, as in the PAL validity [ψ][χ]ϕ↔ [ψ∧ [ψ]χ]ϕ, and
because P (ψ ∧ [ψ]χ) ⊆ Q ∪R if P (ψ) ⊆ Q and P (χ) ⊆ R.
Concerning 〈Q〉[R]ϕ → [Q]〈R〉ϕ (CR) and [Q]〈R〉ϕ → 〈Q〉[R]ϕ (MK) the first
is invalid in SAPAL (counterexample omitted) and we do not know whether the
second one is valid, but this seems unlikely. The proof of their APAL validity
consists in first announcing the value of all variables occurring in the formula ϕ,
and then using that ϕ is true in the subsequent model restriction iff it is valid
on that restriction. This announcement cannot be made if Q ∪R ⊂ P (ϕ).
3.2 SCAPAL
The SCAPAL quantifier does not distribute over conjunction: [⊆]ϕ∧ [⊆]ψ is not












Fig. 2. Model (N, 1) on the left, (M, 10) in the middle, (M |(p ∨ q), 10) on the right.
Example 1. Consider model (M, 10) in Fig. 2 (pq: p is true and q is false). Then:
M, 10 6|= [⊆]((Kap→ KbKap) ∧ ¬q)
M, 10 |= [⊆](Kap→ KbKap)
M, 10 |= [⊆]¬q
The first is false because, as depicted:
M, 10 |= 〈p ∨ q〉(Kap ∧ ¬KbKap), so
M, 10 |= 〈p ∨ q〉((Kap ∧ ¬KbKap) ∨ q), and therefore
M, 10 |= 〈⊆〉((Kap ∧ ¬KbKap) ∨ q), which is equivalent to
M, 10 6|= [⊆]((Kap→ KbKap) ∧ ¬q).
The second is true because the only model restrictions containing 10 that we
can obtain with formulas involving p are {10, 11} and {10, 11, 00, 01}. The third
is true because q is false in state 10.
Therefore, [⊆]ϕ ∧ [⊆]ψ is not equivalent to [⊆](ϕ ∧ ψ).
Proposition 3. Valid in SCAPAL are: [⊆]ϕ → ϕ (T), [⊆]ϕ → [⊆][⊆]ϕ (F),
[⊆]〈⊆〉ϕ→ 〈⊆〉[⊆]ϕ (MK) and 〈⊆〉[⊆]ϕ→ [⊆]〈⊆〉ϕ (CR).
Proof. T and 4 are valid for the same reason as in SAPAL. For CR and MK we
can now (unlike for SAPAL) use the same method as in APAL, as in any state
of a model we can announce the value of all variables occurring in ϕ. A proof
of CR is found in [16, Prop. 3.10] (for the similar logic APAL+), which corrects
the incorrect proof of CR for APAL in [6]). A proof of MK it is found in [6].
3.3 QIPAL and IPAL
We recall that in APAL the quantification is over ϕ ∈ LPAL. Fairly complex
counterexamples demonstrate that [!]ϕ→ [ψ]ϕ is invalid for certain ψ ∈ LAPAL
containing quantifiers. Now in [ψ↓]ϕ, ψ ∈ LQIPAL may also contain quantifiers.
This makes the relation to [!] unclear. In LIPAL, that ψ must be in LPAL and
the relation is clearer.
Proposition 4. Let ψ ∈ LPAL, χ ∈ LIPAL and pointed model (M, s) be given.
The following are equivalent:
1. M, s |= 〈ψ↓〉χ
2. there is a ϕ ∈ LPAL such that |= ϕ→ ψ and M, s |= 〈ϕ〉χ,
3. there is a ϕ ∈ LPAL such that M |= ϕ→ ψ and M, s |= 〈ϕ〉χ,
4. there is a ϕ ∈ LPAL such that M, s |= 〈ϕ ∧ ψ〉χ.
Proof.
1⇔ 2 This is the semantics of the 〈ψ↓〉 quantifier (in dual form).
2⇒ 3 From |= ϕ→ ψ it trivially follows that M |= ϕ→ ψ.
3⇒ 4 Suppose that there is a ϕ ∈ LPAL such that M |= ϕ → ψ and M, s |=
〈ϕ〉χ. Because M |= ϕ → ψ, we have M |= ϕ ↔ (ϕ ∧ ψ), and therefore
M |ϕ = M |(ϕ ∧ ψ). From M, s |= 〈ϕ〉χ then follows that M, s |= 〈ϕ ∧ ψ〉χ.
4⇒ 2 Suppose that there is a ϕ ∈ LPAL such that M, s |= 〈ϕ ∧ ψ〉χ. Let
ϕ′ = ϕ∧ψ, and note that ϕ′ ∈ LPAL. We have |= ϕ′ → ψ and M, s |= 〈ϕ′〉χ.
The positive formulas L+PAL are the PAL-fragment p | ¬p | ϕ∧ϕ | ϕ∨ϕ | Kaϕ |
[¬ϕ]ϕ. The truth of positive formulas (corresponding to the universal fragment
in first-order logic) is preserved after update [17].
Corollary 2. Let ψ ∈ L+PAL. Then 〈ψ↓〉χ is equivalent to 〈!〉〈ψ〉χ.
Proof. Let M, s |= 〈ψ↓〉χ. From Prop. 4.4 we obtain that there is ϕ ∈ LPAL such
that M, s |= 〈ϕ ∧ ψ〉χ. As ψ is positive, from that we obtain M, s |= 〈ϕ〉〈ψ〉χ.
By the definition of the APAL quantifier, it follows that M, s |= 〈!〉〈ψ〉χ.
Proposition 5. Let ϕ ∈ LIPAL. Then [>↓]ϕ is equivalent to [!]ϕ and [⊥↑]ϕ is
equivalent to [!]ϕ.
Proof. Let model (M, s) and ϕ ∈ LQIPAL be given. Then: M, s |= [>↓]ϕ, iff
M, s |= [ψ]ϕ for all ψ ∈ LPAL with |= ψ → >, iff M, s |= [ψ]ϕ for all ψ ∈ LPAL,
iff M, s |= [!]ϕ.
Similarly, M, s |= [⊥↑]ϕ, iff M, s |= [ψ]ϕ for all ψ ∈ LPAL with |= ⊥ → ψ, iff
M, s |= [ψ]ϕ for all ψ ∈ LPAL, iff M, s |= [!]ϕ.
Proposition 6. Valid in QIPAL are [ψ↑]ϕ→ ϕ (T) and also [ψ↑]ϕ→ [ψ↑][χ↑]ϕ
and [ψ↓]ϕ→ [ψ↓][χ↓]ϕ (4)
Proof. All proofs are as in Prop. 2 and 3.
However, [ψ↓]ϕ → ϕ (T) is invalid. Whenever M |ψ is a proper submodel of a
given model M , the trivial announcement is not allowed. Also, [ψ↑]ϕ→ [χ↑][ψ↑]ϕ
and [ψ↓]ϕ→ [χ↓][ψ↓]ϕ are invalid because of Moorean phenomena.
We envisage similar results for the more general QIPAL quantifier in future.
4 Expressivity
We now address the relative expressivity of APAL, FSAPAL and SCAPAL and
IPAL. Given logics L and L′ with languages LL and LL′ , L is at least as expres-
sive as L′, notation L1  L2, iff for ϕ ∈ LL there is a ϕ′ ∈ LL′ such that ϕ is
equivalent to ϕ′. Logics L and L′ are equally expressive iff L  L′ and L′  L,
L is less expressive than L′, notation L ≺ L′, iff L  L′ but L′ 6 L; L and L′
are incomparable (in expressivity), notation L  L′, iff L 6 L′ and L′ 6 L.
4.1 APAL 6 FSAPAL and APAL 6 SCAPAL
We show that there is an APAL-formula that can distinguish two pointed models
that cannot be distinguished by any FSAPAL-formula. We use that APAL, unlike
FSAPAL, quantifies over arbitrarily many atoms. The proof is similar to the
proof that APAL 6 PAL in [6].
Proposition 7. APAL  FSAPAL and APAL  SCAPAL.
Proof. Consider APAL formula 〈!〉(Kap∧¬KbKap), and assume towards a con-
tradiction that ψ is an equivalent FSAPAL formula. Let q /∈ P (ψ). Now consider
models (M, 10) and (N, 1) in Fig. 2 (where the value of q in states 0 and 1 of N
is irrelevant). These models are p-bisimilar. We now have that:
1. M, 10 |= 〈!〉(Kap ∧ ¬KbKap) (observe M |(p ∨ q) in Fig. 2)
2. N, 1 6|= 〈!〉(Kap ∧ ¬KbKap)
3. M, 10 |= ψ iff N, 1 |= ψ ((M, 10)↔p (N, 1) implies (M, 10) ≡pFSAPAL (N, 1)
by Prop. 1)
This is a contradiction. Therefore APAL 6 FSAPAL.
As Prop. 1 also applies to SCAPAL, this also proves that APAL 6 SCAPAL.
4.2 SCAPAL 6 APAL and FSAPAL 6 APAL
The proof is similar to that of the previous section, but more involved. We
now show that the assumption that there is an APAL formula ψ equivalent to
SCAPAL formula 〈⊆〉(¬q ∧ Kap ∧ ¬KbKap) leads to a contradiction. Prior to
that we present models and lemmas used in the proof.
Consider models Mn and Nn as follows, where n ∈ N is odd. Model Mn =
(S,∼, V ) is such that (i) S = [0, 2n − 1], (ii) for any i < n, 2i ∼b (2i + 1) and,
except for i = 0, (2i − 1) ∼a 2i and also (2n − 1) ∼a 0, and (iii) for any i < n,
variable p is true in states 2i, variable q is only true in state n and variable r is
always false. Model Nn is like model Mn except that variable r is only true in n
and variable q is always false. Fig. 3 depicts M3 and N3.
Lemma 3. Let M ⊆Mn, N ⊆ Nn, i, j, k ∈ N, with i ∈ D(M) and j ∈ D(N). If
(M, i) 'k (N, j), then for all χ ∈ LPAL such that M, i |= χ there is a χ′ ∈ LPAL
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Fig. 3. The models M3 and N3
Proof. All subsets of Mn and all subsets of Nn are distinguishable in LEL (where
we use that PAL is as expressive as EL), using the distance from the q-state
respectively r-state.4 Also, any proper submodel of Mn or Nn, where without
loss of generality we only consider connected submodels containing the evaluation
point, is a finite chain of alternating a-links and b-links of which all subsets are
distinguishable, using that both edges of the chain are distinguishable: either a
or b knows either p or ¬p in one edge but not in the other edge, except for the
singleton model that however is a trivial case.
Lemma 4. Let M ⊆ Mn, N ⊆ Nn and i, j, k ∈ N, with i ∈ D(M) and j ∈
D(N). If (M, i) 'k (N, j), then (M, i) ≡kAPAL (N, j).
Proof. We show the equivalent formulation:
For all ϕ ∈ LAPAL, M ⊆ Mn, N ⊆ Nn and i, j, k ∈ N with i ∈ D(M)
and j ∈ D(N): if (M, i) 'k (N, j) and d(ϕ) ≤ k, then M, i |= ϕ iff
N, j |= ϕ.
The proof is by induction on the structure of ϕ. The cases of interest are Kbϕ,
[ψ]ϕ, and [!]ϕ. As k-bisimilarity is a symmetric relation, it suffices to show only
one direction of the equivalence.
Case Kaϕ: Suppose d(Kaϕ) ≤ k. We have M, i |= Kaϕ iff for all i′ ∼a i,
M, i′ |= ϕ. As (M, i) 'n (N, j), for all j′ ∼a j there is some i′ ∼a i such that
(M, i′) 'k−1 (N, j′). As d(Kaϕ) ≤ n, d(ϕ) ≤ k − 1. Therefore, by induction,
N, j′ |= ϕ. And therefore N, j |= Kaϕ.
Case [ψ]ϕ: Suppose d([ψ]ϕ) ≤ k, and M, i |= [ψ]ϕ. Let d(ψ) = x and
d(ϕ) = y, then x+ y = d(ψ) +d(ϕ) = d([ψ]ϕ) ≤ k. By definition, M, i |= [ψ]ϕ iff
M, i |= ψ implies M |ψ, i |= ϕ. From M, i |= ψ, (M, i) 'k (N, j) and d(ψ) = x ≤ k
and induction we obtain N, j |= ψ. From (M, i) 'k (N, j), M, i |= ψ, d(ψ) =
x ≤ k − y, a part identical to that of Lemma 2 except that where bisimulation
invariance for PAL is used on ψ ∈ LPAL we now use induction on ψ ∈ LAPAL,
we obtain that (M |ψ, i) 'y (N |ψ, j). From that, M |ψ, i |= ϕ, d(ϕ) = y and
4 For example, state 0 is M3 is distinguished by K̂bK̂aK̂bq ∧¬K̂aK̂bq; 0 is the unique
state where we can get with three steps but not with two.
induction we obtain N |ψ, j |= ϕ. Then, N, j |= ψ implies N |ψ, j |= ϕ is by
definition N, j |= [ψ]ϕ.
Case [!]ϕ:
M, i |= [!]ϕ, iff
M, i |= [ψ]ϕ for all ψ ∈ LPAL, iff
M, i |= ψ implies M |ψ, i |= ϕ for all ψ ∈ LPAL, iff (Lemma 3)
N, j |= ψ′ implies N |ψ′, i |= ϕ for all ψ′ ∈ LPAL, iff
N, j |= [ψ′]ϕ for all ψ′ ∈ LPAL, iff
N, j |= [!]ϕ.
Proposition 8. SCAPAL 6 APAL.
Proof. Consider LSCAPAL formula ϕ = 〈⊆〉(¬q ∧Kap∧¬KbKap). Let ψ be the
supposedly equivalent LAPAL formula. Take n > d(ψ). We now show that:
1. Mn, 0 |= 〈⊆〉(¬q ∧Kap ∧ ¬KbKap)
2. Nn, 0 6|= 〈⊆〉(¬q ∧Kap ∧ ¬KbKap)
3. Mn, 0 |= ψ iff Nn, 0 |= ψ
These items are proved by the following arguments:
1. The state n is distinguished by formula q. This allows us to distinguish each
finite subset of the domain, in the usual way, in LEL (note that there is no
mirror symmetry along the 0—n ‘diameter’ of the circular models Mn and
Nn). Thus there is a formula η ∈ LEL|q that distinguishes the set of states
{0, 1}. We now have that:
Mn, 0 |= η
Mn|η, 0 |= ¬q ∧Kap ∧ ¬KbKap
Mn, 0 |= 〈η〉(¬q ∧Kap ∧ ¬KbKap)
Mn, 0 |= 〈⊆〉(¬q ∧Kap ∧ ¬KbKap)
2. On the other hand, Nn, 0 6|= 〈⊆〉(¬q ∧Kap ∧ ¬KbKap). This is because we
cannot use that r is only true in n, as r 6∈ P (¬q ∧ Kap ∧ ¬KbKap), and
because (Nn, 0) 'pq (O, 0). Clearly O, 0 6|= 〈⊆〉(¬q ∧Kap ∧ ¬KbKap).
3. However, Mn, 0 |= ψ iff Nn, 0 |= ψ. This follows from Lemma 4, as n > d(ψ)
and (Mn, 0)↔d(ψ) (Nn, 0).
Proposition 9. FSAPAL 6 APAL.
Proof. As Prop. 8, but we now take FSAPAL formula 〈q〉(¬q ∧Kap∧¬KbKap)
instead of SCAPAL formula 〈⊆〉(¬q ∧Kap ∧ ¬KbKap).
As [!]ϕ is equivalent to [P ]ϕ we rather trivially have that APAL  SAPAL, so
that with Prop. 9 and its consequence SAPAL 6 APAL we immediately obtain:
Corollary 3. APAL ≺ SAPAL.
4.3 SCAPAL ≺ FSAPAL
Proposition 10. SCAPAL  FSAPAL.
Proof. It is trivial that SCAPAL FSAPAL, since |= [⊆]ϕ↔ [P (ϕ)]ϕ. Formally,
we inductively define a translation function f from SCAPAL to FSAPAL by
f(p) = p f(ϕ ∨ ψ) = f(ϕ) ∨ f(ψ) f([ϕ]ψ) = [f(ϕ)]f(ψ)
f(¬ϕ) = ¬f(ϕ) f(Kaϕ) = Kaf(ϕ) f([⊆]ϕ) = [P (ϕ)]f(ϕ)
In the final line we could equivalently have written f([⊆]ϕ) = [P (f(ϕ))]f(ϕ),
as f does not affect the set of atoms that occur in a formula. We then have
|= ϕ↔ f(ϕ) (which is shown by induction), and therefore SCAPAL  FSAPAL.
We now show SCAPAL ≺ FSAPAL. In the proof we use models M−n,n and
N−n,n similar to Mn and Nn used in the previous subsection. They are depicted
in Fig. 4 for n = 3, compare to Fig. 3. (Imagine ‘cutting open’ M3 and N3 at
the q resp. r state, and remove r as we can now use the distinguishing power of
p on the edges of the chain.) Similarly to Lemma 4, we first show a Lemma 5.
0(p) 1 2(p) 3(q)−3(q) −2(p) −1M−3,3 :
b a ba b a
0(p) 1 2(p) 3−3 −2(p) −1N−3,3 :
b a ba b a
Fig. 4. The models M−3,3 and N−3,3
Lemma 5. Let M ⊆ M−n,n, N ⊆ N−n,n and i, j, k ∈ N, with i ∈ D(M) and
j ∈ D(N). If (M, i) 'k (N, j), then (M, i) ≡kSCAPAL (N, j).
Proof. We show by formula induction that M, i |= ϕ iff N, j |= ϕ for any ϕ ∈
LSCAPAL with d(ϕ) ≤ k. Cases Kaψ and [χ]ψ are the same. The case quantifier
[⊆]ψ is different and shown as follows.
First, suppose that q 6∈ P (ψ). Then from (M, i) ↔P (ψ) (N, j) and Lemma 1
it directly follows that M, i |= [⊆]ψ iff N, j |= [⊆]ψ.
Next, suppose that q ∈ P (ψ); w.l.o.g. we may also assume that p ∈ P (ψ). By
assumption, (M, i)↔k (N, j). Just as for Lemma 3, every M ′ ⊆M is definable
in M by a formula in LPAL|pq, and every N ′ ⊆ N is definable in N by a
formula in LPAL|pq. It follows that for every χ ∈ LPAL|pq with M, i |= χ there
is a ξ ∈ LPAL|pq such that (M |χ, i) ↔k (N |ξ, j), and vice versa. Therefore,
M, i |= [⊆]ψ iff N, j |= [⊆]ψ.
Proposition 11. SCAPAL ≺ FSAPAL.
Proof. We proceed as usual, however, with distinguishing FSAPAL formula
〈q〉(Kap ∧ ¬KbKap). Let ψ be the supposedly equivalent LSCAPAL formula.
Take n > d(ψ). Then:
1. M−n,n, 0 |= 〈q〉(Kap ∧ ¬KbKap)
2. N−n,n, 0 6|= 〈q〉(Kap ∧ ¬KbKap) (obvious)
3. M−n,n, 0 |= ψ iffN−n,n, 0 |= ψ (use (M−n,n, 0)↔d(ψ) (N−n,n, 0) & Lemma 5)
4.4 IPAL
Proposition 12. APAL  IPAL.
Proof. This follows from Prop. 5 that [>↓]ϕ is equivalent to [!]ϕ.
We also obtained strictness, by a rather involved proof that is omitted from the
submission for space constraints and therefore called a conjecture.
Conjecture 1. APAL ≺ IPAL.
The relative expressivity between IPAL and FSAPAL/SCAPAL mirrors the re-
sults already obtained between APAL and FSAPAL/SCAPAL.
Proposition 13. IPAL  FSAPAL and IPAL  SCAPAL.
Proof. IPAL 6 FSAPAL and IPAL 6 SCAPAL are shown as APAL 6 FSAPAL
(Prop. 9) and APAL 6 SCAPAL (Prop. 8), except that in the inductive case for
the quantifier of the proof of Lemma 4 we do not consider all witnesses ψ for the
quantifier 〈!〉 but only those that imply the given χ in 〈χ↓〉 or that are implied
by the given χ in 〈χ↓〉.
From APAL  IPAL, FSAPAL 6 APAL and SCAPAL 6 APAL (Prop. 7),
we immediately obtain FSAPAL 6 IPAL and SCAPAL 6 IPAL.
5 Substructural implication, PAL and IPAL
The satisfaction clause for IPAL announcements [ϕ↓]ψ is loosely inspired by
the satisfaction clause for substructural implication ϕ ⇒ ψ in the relational
semantics for substructural logics [30,31] and the informational interpretation of
the semantics. Relational models for substructural logics comprise a set of states
S and a ternary accessibility relation R on S. The substructural implication is
a box-like binary modal operator with the following satisfaction clause:
x  ϕ⇒ ψ ⇐⇒ (∀y, z ∈ S)(Rxyz & y  ϕ =⇒ z  ψ)
Dunn and Restall point out that “perhaps the best reading [of Rxyz] is to say
that the combination of the pieces of information x and y (not necessarily the
union) is a piece of information in z” [18, p. 67]. Restall adds that “a body of
information warrants ϕ⇒ ψ if and only if whenever you update that information
with new information which warrants ϕ, the resulting (perhaps new) body of
information warrants ψ” [29, p. 362] (notation adjusted).
On the informational reading, substructural implication clearly resembles an
information update operator. It is therefore natural to inquire into the simi-
larities and differences between substructural implication and epistemic update
operators such as public announcements. Similarities between substructural logic
and information update have been noted before. Van Benthem [11,12] observes
that various dynamic consequence relations, arising from defining consequence in
terms of the effects of successive updates (such that ϕ⇒ ψ roughly corresponds
to [ϕ]ψ), lack most of the standard structural properties. Aucher [3,4] observes
that dynamic epistemic logic can be seen as a two-sorted substructural logic and
that the product update is a special case of the ternary accessibility relation.
Differences between substructural logics and PAL are plentiful. For exam-
ple, the former are closed under substitution and the latter contains Boolean
negation and conservatively extends classical propositional logic. The aspect of
substructural implication that directly influenced our formulation of the IPAL↓
announcement is that multiple bodies of information y supporting ϕ are taken
into account when evaluating ϕ⇒ ψ. This aspect is easily incorporated in PAL
by requiring that, in evaluating “after announcing ϕ, ψ is the case” in (M, s), we
have to look at multiple submodels N of M containing s such that ϕ is satisfied
in all states in N . This is precisely what the satisfaction clause for [ϕ↓]ψ requires.
This new [ϕ↓] operator has interesting properties that we wish to explore later.
For example, Prop. 6 established [ψ↓]ϕ → [ψ↓][χ↓]ϕ which translates into the
substructural property of right weakening ‘from ψ ⇒ ϕ infer ψ, χ⇒ ϕ’; whereas
‘van Benthem’ dynamic consequence does not satisfy right weakening.
6 Conclusions and further research
We investigated the expressivity of the logics FSAPAL, SCAPAL and IPAL.
Let us finally also observe that their axiomatizations promise to be very similar
to that of APAL, and the we also expect these logics still to have undecidable
satisfiability problems. The use of the IPAL quantification [ϕ↓]ψ to model sub-
structural implication ϕ⇒ ψ clearly needs further research.
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